Introduction (cont).
Notably, however, Article 1(2) of the Transparency Rules requires certain conditions to be satisfied before the Transparency Rules can apply to any arbitration arising under any of the approximately 3000 treaties that were concluded before the Rules entered into force on April 1, 2014. Namely, for the Rules to apply under those "existing treaties," either (1) the investor's home State and the respondent have to expressly agree, after April 1, 2014 , to apply the Rules to their treaty (and all disputes arising under it); or (2) the investor and respondent State must agree to apply the Rules in the context of a particular dispute.
This provision requires States and/or investors to expressly "opt in" to the Transparency Rules for disputes arising under existing treaties. Given that it is this vast mass of existing treaties that is likely to give rise to the bulk of investment arbitrations for the foreseeable future, the hurdle imposed by Article 1(2) risks undermining UNCITRAL's overarching goal of ensuring transparency in investor-State arbitration. To address that issue, UNCITRAL decided to create another instrument that States could use to require application of the Transparency Rules to any investment arbitration arising under their existing treaties. 3 In July 2014, UNCITRAL finalized and adopted the "Mauritius Convention on Transparency" ("Transparency Convention"). 4 This treaty establishes a mechanism through which all parties to existing investment treaties can efficiently and effectively update the procedural rules governing investor-State arbitrations under those treaties so as to effectively implement the Transparency Rules and better take into account the public interest nature of these disputes.
In order to promote greater awareness and understanding of the Convention, this paper reproduces its text and, after each article, provides additional comments on the provisions. The commentary is based on attendance at UNCITRAL's sessions, as well as written public records of the negotiations. 
Convention Text and Commentary Preamble
The Parties to this Convention,
Recognizing the value of arbitration as a method of settling disputes that may arise in the context of international relations, and the extensive and wide-ranging use of arbitration for the settlement of investor-State disputes, Also recognizing the need for provisions on transparency in the settlement of treaty-based investor-State disputes to take account of the public interest involved in such arbitrations, Believing that the Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 11 July 2013 ("UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency"), effective as of 1 April 2014, would contribute significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment disputes, Noting the great number of treaties providing for the protection of investments or investors already in force, and the practical importance of promoting the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency to arbitration under those already concluded investment treaties,
Noting also article 1 (2) and (9) 
Comments
Article 1 governs the scope of the Convention, stating that it applies to arbitrations between -an investor and a State, or -an investor and a regional economic integration organization (e.g., the European Union) 4 under an "investment treaty" that was concluded before the Transparency Rules came into effect on April 1, 2014 (referred to herein as "existing treaties"). The Transparency Convention's temporal coverage (i.e., covering treaties concluded before April 1, 2014) is the same as the treaties excluded from coverage under Article 1(2) of the Transparency Rules. This is because the aim of the Transparency Convention is to create a mechanism through which States can ensure that disputes under those existing treaties will be subject to the Transparency Rules.
The term "investment treaty" in Article 1(2) of the Convention has the same meaning and scope as the term "treaty" under the Transparency Rules. The Convention only applies to arbitrations arising under investment treaties, not investor-State arbitrations under contracts. Disputing parties to a given contractbased investor-State arbitration, however, could still agree to apply all or some of the Transparency Rules to their dispute.
In the Convention, the term "State" is used to refer to individual States; the term "Party" is used to refer to individual States and to regional economic integration organizations, both of which may be signatories to an investment treaty. "Investor-State" arbitration refers to arbitration initiated by an investor against a treaty party, which may be a State or a regional economic integration organization. No mandatory application under Article 2 (1) -The respondent and the investor's home State are parties to the Transparency Convention, but the investor's home State has taken a reservation for the particular treaty. The Transparency Convention would not apply in arbitration under that treaty. -The respondent and the investor's home State are parties to the Transparency Convention, but the respondent has taken a reservation for the particular treaty. The Transparency Convention would not apply in arbitration under that treaty. -The respondent and the investor's home State are parties to the Transparency Convention, but the respondent has taken a reservation stating that the Transparency Convention only requires application of the Transparency Rules when it is the UNCITRAL arbitration rules that govern the dispute, and the investor has chosen to arbitrate the dispute under the ICSID arbitration rules.
Article 2 -Application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
For multilateral investment treaties, not all parties to the investment treaty need to be parties to the Transparency Convention in order for the Transparency Rules to apply under Article 2(1). It is sufficient for the home State of the investor and the respondent to be parties.
Notably, the drafting of Article 2(1) emphasizes the need for the claimant to be of a "State" that is party to the Convention and that has not taken a relevant reservation for the underlying treaty. This was done in order to limit the effect of commitments and reservations entered into by regional economic integration organizations, and to address the specific issue that arises when a regional economic integration organization and its Member States are both party to a particular existing investment treaty (i.e., as occurs due to the EU's status as a party to the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT")).
Pursuant to Article 2(1), when an investor brings a claim against a State under the ECT, the relevant question for determining whether there is "reciprocity" under Article 2(1) is whether the investor's home State is a party to the Convention and has not taken a reservation for the ECT, not whether the EU is a party to the Convention or has taken a reservation for the ECT. If the claimant's home State is a member of the EU and a party to the ECT, but has carved out the ECT from the scope of the Transparency Convention, then there can be no mandatory application of the Transparency Rules under Article 2(1) to disputes brought by that investor against other parties to the ECT. This remains the case even if the European Union (a "home" regional economic integration organization) is a party to the Transparency Convention and has not taken a reservation for the ECT. Whether the European Union has signed onto the Transparency Convention or taken any reservations are issues that are only relevant in cases when the European Union is a respondent in an investment arbitration.
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Article 2(2) -Unilateral offers by respondent States open to acceptance by investors
If the conditions of Article 2(1) are not satisfied, Article 2(2) provides a second mechanism for mandatory application of the Transparency Rules. Pursuant to this provision (and subject to certain reservations, discussed further below), parties to the Convention effectively make standing unilateral offers to arbitrate disputes under the Transparency Rules when they are respondents. If these offers are accepted by investors in the context of a particular dispute, then that dispute will be governed by the Transparency Rules. The respondent is bound under the Convention's terms to its offer (subject to the State's rights to issue reservations and denounce the treaty, discussed further below).
Under Article 2(2), it is irrelevant whether the investor's home State is a party to the Convention or, if so, has made a reservation. Nothing in the Transparency Convention permits the investor's home State to limit the scope of a respondent's unilateral offer, or to prevent the investor from accepting that offer.
Like Article 2(1), Article 2(2) permits States to take certain reservations. In particular, Article 2(2) gives States three options for narrowing and even entirely opting out of the unilateral offer. A State may:
-issue a reservation entirely carving out a particular treaty from the Transparency Convention (see Article 3(1)(a)); -issue a reservation carving out disputes governed by arbitration rules other than the UNCITRAL arbitration rules (see Article 3(1)(b)); and -issue a reservation stating that Article 2(2) shall not apply to disputes in which it is a respondent, thereby declining to bind itself to any unilateral offer (see Article 3(1)(c)).
The Transparency Convention does not require the investor to agree to apply the Rules through any specific form. One delegation proposed requiring the claimant's agreement to be explicit and in writing, but that proposal did not receive the support necessary for it to be adopted. 7 A claimant could, for instance, indicate in its notice of arbitration that it accepts the offer, or could orally agree during a procedural conference.
Article 2(3) -Proper version of the Rules
The Working Group foresaw that the Transparency Rules might be updated in the future. This article clarifies that if the Transparency Rules are amended, the most recent version of the Rules will apply. (As described below, however, States can take a reservation under Article 3(2) to modify that rule).
Article 2(4) -Hierarchy of the Rules
This provision addresses the relationship between the Transparency Rules and the underlying investment treaty.
Article 1(7) of the Transparency Rules, which addresses the hierarchy of the Rules in relation to the underlying investment treaty, states that where there is a conflict between the Transparency Rules and the investment treaty, the "provisions of the [investment] treaty shall prevail." Article 2(4) of the Convention effectively deletes that provision for situations when the Transparency Rules apply pursuant to the Transparency Convention.
This provision in the Convention that modifies the Transparency Rules helps to increase transparency in disputes arising under treaties that were concluded before the Rules' effective date. There was a concern that, if Article 1(7) of the Transparency Rules were to apply, it would allow an investment treaty with a lower standard of transparency to prevail over the Transparency Rules, undermining the effectiveness of the Transparency Convention as a tool for making arbitrations under those treaties more open.
One issue that is not expressly addressed in the Convention is the relationship between the Transparency Rules and mandatory domestic law, and whether that relationship is affected when the Transparency Rules are applied pursuant to the Transparency Convention. Generally, arbitration rules that apply in contract disputes are subject to and cannot override contrary mandatory provisions of domestic law at the seat of the arbitration. When arbitration rules apply pursuant to a treaty, however, there are different ways of viewing the resulting legal hierarchy:
-One interpretation is that the treaty merely states that application under certain procedural rules is permissible or required, but does not intend to alter the default status of procedural rules by elevating them to the treaty level where they could trump contrary domestic law. -A second interpretation is that the treaty incorporates the procedural rules by reference in its text, and by doing so makes the rules an integral part of the treaty, elevating those rules to treaty status where they can override inconsistent domestic law.
Each interpretation has different implications for transparency.
Under the first interpretation, for instance, States could enact domestic law that greatly restricts transparency of investor-State arbitration. In such a case, even if the Transparency Rules applied pursuant to the Transparency Convention, then domestic law could potentially trump and defeat the aim of the Transparency Rules and Transparency Convention. The Transparency Rules speak to this issue, and try to prevent an outcome in which domestic law can eviscerate the impact of the Rules. In Article 1(7), the Rules set forth the basic principle that, in case of conflict, mandatory rules of domestic law will prevail over the Transparency Rules. In Article 1(6), however, the Rules state that when a State takes any measure or action "having the effect of wholly undermining the transparency objectives of these Rules, the arbitral tribunal shall ensure that those objectives prevail."
Based on Article 1(6) of the Rules, which was adopted by unanimous agreement of the Working Group, 6 and which evidences the Working Group's concern about States using their own laws to avoid disclosure required under the Transparency Rules, it would seem unreasonable for the Working Group to have intended the Convention to be easily undermined by domestic law. On that basis, the second interpretation -under which the Transparency Rules attain treaty status prevailing over domestic lawseems more plausible than the first.
In cases when the Convention's application of the Transparency Rules trumps domestic law there is also the chance that the result will be a reduction, rather than expansion, of transparency. If, for instance, in the application of the Rules, a tribunal determines material to be confidential and orders that it not be made publicly available, there is a possibility that domestic courts that are later faced with requests seeking disclosure of such "confidential" information will consider the tribunal's determination of "confidentiality" to prevail over contrary domestic law, preventing citizens from accessing information that their government otherwise had a duty to disclose.
In some investment treaties, provisions on investor-State arbitration indicate that States have anticipated and specifically avoided such an outcome. A number of treaties requiring transparency (and providing for determinations of confidentiality) make clear that no application of the rules can prevent States from 9 disclosing information that they are required to disclose under applicable domestic law. These provisions safeguard the role of domestic law in ensuring access to information held by the government. (Notably, in these treaties, provisions on transparency and confidentiality are included directly in the text of the agreements. There is therefore no question about whether those provisions have the status of general arbitration rules or international law. Their status as international law is clear).
The Transparency Convention does not have a similar "safeguard" provision ensuring that tribunals' determinations of "confidentiality" do not prevent disclosures required under domestic law. Consequently, assuming that the second interpretation applies (under which the Rules are elevated to treaty status), there is a potential risk that a determination of "confidentiality" by an arbitral tribunal could be considered to override domestic disclosure requirements.
Yet, given the negotiation history of the Rules and the Convention, that risk should be minimal. The record of the negotiations contains no suggestion that such a "safeguard" provision was suggested, much less defeated. Moreover, given UNCITRAL's concern about preventing government actions that would undermine the Rules' transparency objectives, 7 the omission of a "safeguard" clause does not seem to suggest rejection of the principle that such a clause represents.
Article 2(5) -Impact of most-favoured nation provisions
The drafters significantly debated the desirability of this provision that prevents investors from invoking a most-favoured nation (MFN) provision in an underlying investment treaty to attempt to either avoid or secure application of the Transparency Rules. One main argument raised against inclusion of that provision in the Convention was that, by including it, UNCITRAL might appear to be taking a position on whether an MFN provision could apply to require the same or better treatment to investors on not only substantive matters, but also procedural matters, such as transparency in dispute settlement proceedings.
Nevertheless, the negotiators ultimately opted to include the language in the Convention. Delegations emphasized that the travaux preparatoires for the Convention would reflect UNCITRAL's understanding that it was not taking any position on whether and how the MFN provision could apply to dispute settlement proceedings. Based on the availability and clarity of that negotiating history, UNCITRAL concluded that the certainty that could be provided to tribunals by a provision barring claimants from seeking to use MFN provisions to expand or narrow the scope of the Transparency Convention outweighed the risk that such an MFN-bar might unintentionally send a signal regarding application of MFN provisions more generally. 8 Despite that MFN-bar, a claimant might still try to present the tribunal with an argument that the Transparency Rules should or should not apply pursuant to the MFN article of the underlying investment treaty. In such a case, the tribunal will have to interpret the investment treaty's MFN provision.
As noted above, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) on application of successive treaties to the same subject matter will govern whether and how the Transparency Convention impacts MFN provisions in investment treaties. According to that article: …
When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.
When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: (a) As between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3; (b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
… Pursuant to Article 30(3) and 30(4)(a) of the VCLT, when the respondent and the investor's home State are both party to the investment treaty and to the Transparency Convention, and have not reserved the investment treaty from the Convention, the Convention will operate as a "procedural bar" preventing investors from seeking to use the investment treaty's MFN provision to secure or avoid application of the Transparency Rules under the Transparency Convention. 9 When, however, the situation is instead governed by Article 30(4)(b) (e.g., when only the investor's home State is party to the Transparency Convention or there is a reservation for the relevant treaty), the effect of the MFN bar is less clear.
Article 3 -Reservations
Text
A Party may declare that: (a) It shall not apply this Convention to investor-State arbitration under a specific investment treaty, identified by title and name of the contracting parties to that investment treaty; (b) Article 2(1) and (2) shall not apply to investor-State arbitration conducted using a specific set of arbitration rules or procedures other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and in which it is a respondent; (c)
Article 2 (2) shall not apply in investor-State arbitration in which it is a respondent.
In the event of a revision of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, a Party may, within six months of the adoption of such revision, declare that it shall not apply that revised version of the Rules.
Parties may make multiple reservations in a single instrument. In such an instrument, each declaration made: (a) In respect of a specific investment treaty under paragraph (1)(a); (b) In respect of a specific set of arbitration rules or procedures under paragraph (1)(b); (c) Under paragraph (1)(c); or (d) Under paragraph (2);
shall constitute a separate reservation capable of separate withdrawal under article 4(6).
No reservations are permitted except those expressly authorised in this article.
Comments
Article 3 sets forth the reservations that State parties to the Convention may take.
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Article 3(1) -Three core reservations limiting application of the Convention and Rules
Paragraph 1 includes the core reservations that can be used to limit application of the Convention and the Rules. As referred to in the text and comments on Article 2, there are three main types:
-a reservation carving out arbitrations under a particular treaty from the Transparency Convention (Article 3(1)(a)); -a reservation carving out disputes under certain non-UNCITRAL arbitration rules from Articles 2(1) (reciprocal application) and 2(2) (unilateral offers) (Article 3(1)(b)); and -a reservation under which the State opts out from Article 2(2) (unilateral offers) (Article 3(1)(c)).
Each of these reservations adopts a "negative list" approach: all treaties and all disputes under those treaties are covered unless a State party specifically declares otherwise. Moreover, delegations unanimously agreed "that it would be unacceptable" for a State to accede to the Transparency Convention and then carve out its entire content by use of reservations under Article 3.
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Article 3(1)(a) allows parties to exclude arbitrations under specific investment treaties from the Convention, whether doing because they believe the Transparency Rules set a disclosure standard for their treaties that is too high, or, for States that already require transparency in some of their existing treaties, one that may be too low. For the Article 3(1)(a) reservation to apply, a party will have to list the title of the investment treaty it wishes to exclude from the Transparency Convention and name the contracting parties to that investment treaty.
When a respondent has timely taken an Article 3(1)(a) reservation for an investment treaty underlying a given dispute, there can be no application of the Transparency Rules in that dispute under either Article 2(1) (reciprocal application) or 2(2) (unilateral offers).
Article 3(1)(a) reservations by the investor's home State can also affect application of the Rules. If an investor's home State has taken a reservation for a particular investment treaty, and the investor later brings an investment arbitration under that treaty against its host State, then the respondent will not be required under Article 2(1) to arbitrate under the Transparency Rules even if it is a party to the Transparency Convention and has not similarly taken a reservation for that investment treaty.
(Nevertheless, if the respondent has not taken a relevant reservation, and the investor accepts its unilateral offer to arbitrate under the Transparency Rules, those Rules will still apply pursuant to Article 2(2) of the Convention).
The second type of reservation, set forth in Article 3(1)(b), permits States to allow arbitration under the Transparency Rules to be an option that is electable by investors. To illustrate,
-if a State takes a reservation for arbitrations conducted under the ICSID arbitration rules, -the State's investment treaties allow the investor to choose whether to arbitrate disputes under the ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and -an investor selects the ICSID rules to govern the arbitration when bringing an investment treaty dispute against that State, then the Transparency Convention will not require application of the Transparency Rules to that arbitration.
If a State takes an Article 3(1)(b) reservation for disputes under certain sets of arbitration rules, then that reservation will only affect its obligations as a respondent State. The reservation will have no effect on the obligations of the other party or parties to the underlying investment treaties. Thus,
-if States A and B are both parties to a bilateral investment treaty and parties to the Transparency Convention (and have not taken a specific reservation for the A-B BIT), -State A has taken a reservation for all ICSID arbitrations, but State B has not, and -an investor of State A brings an investment arbitration against State B under the ICSID arbitration rules, then the Transparency Convention will require application of the Transparency Rules. If, however, an investor of State B were to bring a claim against State A under the ICSID arbitration rules, then the Transparency Convention would not require application of the Transparency Rules.
The third reservation, which is set forth in Article 3(1)(c) permits States to opt out of the unilateral offer to arbitrate under the Transparency Rules provided in Article 2 (2) . If a State does this, the Transparency Convention will only require application of the Transparency Rules when the conditions of Article 2(1) are satisfied.
Article 3(2) -Reservation to control application of amendments
Paragraph 2 sets out an additional permissible reservation. It allows States to depart from Article 2(3), which provides that the most recent version of the Rules in force at the time of the dispute will govern the arbitration. Thus, if the Transparency Rules are revised in the future to provide for more or less transparency, this reservation allows States to avoid having those new amendments apply.
Article 3(3) -Option for gradual withdrawal of reservations
This provision clarifies that all reservations limiting application of the Transparency Convention or Transparency Rules may be contained in one instrument, but will be treated as separate reservations that can be individually withdrawn. This option for individual withdrawal of specific reservations was designed to make it easier for States to gradually remove those reservations and broaden situations in which the Convention and Rules will apply. 
Article 3(4) -No additional reservations
Comments
This article governs the process and timing for the making, entry into force, and withdrawal of reservations.
The general rule set forth in Article 4 (1) is that States may make reservations to the Convention at any time. There is one exception: A reservation taken under Article 3(2) to prevent application of amendments to the Transparency Rules must be deposited within six months of those amendments being adopted.
A reservation will take affect immediately upon deposit if:
-it is a reservation that the party took when ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention; or -it is the Article 3(2) reservation excepting parties from having to apply the most recent version of the Rules.
Any other reservation -namely, any Article 3(1) reservation a party makes after it has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Convention -only takes effect twelve months after it is deposited with the depositary. This rule, which is set forth in Article 4(4), reflects UNCITRAL's agreement that parties to the Convention should not have unrestricted freedom to unwind the substantive commitments they made when entering into that treaty. Once a State has ratified the Convention and is bound by it, any new reservation that a State makes under Article 3(1) (i.e., a reservation for a particular treaty or particular arbitration rules, or a reservation from the unilateral offer) will not come into effect for a year. The oneyear waiting period was chosen based on the view that the period would need to be of a sufficient length in order to prevent the abuse which could result if States, upon learning of potential disputes, could simply narrow their commitments under the Convention to avoid application of the Transparency Rules. Delegations reasoned that the waiting period should be at least as long as cooling off periods in investment treaties, as those cooling off periods should represent the minimum span of time between when a respondent learns of a pending dispute and when the arbitration is commenced. Based on input during the negotiations that cooling off periods normally range from six to nine months in investment treaties, UNCITRAL settled on the one-year hold.
In contrast to new reservations, all withdrawals of reservations come into effect immediately upon deposit. Similar to Article 3(3) on separate withdrawals, this provision was designed to facilitate expanded coverage of the Transparency Convention and Rules over time.
Reservations and withdrawals are to be deposited with the depositary. Article 6 specifies that the depository is the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
This article provides a special rule for application of the Convention, reservations, and withdrawal of reservations to ongoing treaty arbitrations. The Transparency Convention as in force (or not) at the commencement of the dispute will govern the proceedings.
According to this article, if a State has deposited a reservation for a particular treaty less than twelve months before the commencement of the dispute, that reservation will not apply to the dispute as it will not yet have come into force. In contrast, if the State has deposited a withdrawal of a reservation any time before commencement of the arbitration (e.g., one day before commencement), the withdrawal will be operative for that investment dispute.
Article 6 -Depositary
Text
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the depositary of this Convention.
Comments
The depositary is where States are to deposit their reservations and reservation withdrawals (Article 4), and their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession to the Transparency Convention (Article 7(4)). 
When the number of Parties is relevant in this Convention, a regional economic integration organization does not count as a Party in addition to its member States which are Parties.
Comments
The Convention makes clear throughout that it envisions and allows regional economic integration organizations to be party to the Convention. The specific regional economic integration organization that motivated this approach was the European Union.
For the European Union or any other similar organizations to be a party, it must have actually concluded an investment treaty. When it deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Convention, it will have to supply evidence to the depositary that is also party to an investment treaty by providing the title of the treaty and the name of the parties to that agreement. 
